In Cuba’s hinterland a businessman is born
In Cuba's hinterland a businessman is bornBy Marc FrankGUAIMARO, Cuba | Wed Jan 11, 2012 6:06am EST
(Reuters) – Guaimaro, just one of many small poor and dusty towns along Cuba's sparsely travelled central highway, is best known as the spot where the island's first constitution was signed during the independence war with Spain.
These days the talk of the town is about a different sort of independence in state-dominated Cuba – the privately owned Magno restaurant, the most luxurious place in Gua imaro. Its owner Tomas Mayedo Fernandez is a local boy who once did jail time for involuntary manslaughter but now, in just over a year as an entrepreneur, is a big success.
The eatery is one of more than 1,000 home-based restaurants, or paladares, that have opened on the Communist-run island since restrictions on small private businesses were loosened in late 2010, as part of a broader reform of the Soviet-style economy undertaken by President Raul Castro.
A meal at the Magno will cost you the equivalent of a few dollars for a beer and sandwich to $10 or more for steak and lobster, in a land where the average wage is less than $20 per month.
There are just two other private eateries and a few shabby looking state-run restaurants in Guaimaro, located 400 miles (650 km) east of Havana. But they cater more to the local population rather than passersby and do not boast air-conditioning, lobster, shrimp, beef, whiskey and aged rum.
"I didn't know anything about running a restaurant, but I liked the idea of going into business and so when the law changed I began, little by little," said Mayedo, a strapping young man and son of a cattle rancher in his mid-30s .
Mayedo lived in the second story of the once-crumbling, century-old building. He sold clothing from his living room to make ends meet and looked down on the ruins of the empty store front and big back yard the neighbours had turned into a garbage dump.
SEEING THE POTENTIAL
The place nevertheless had potential because it fronted the central highway, giving it access to a larger customer base than just the small town, he decided.
"We were already working to clean the place up before the law changed," Mayedo said recently, taking time off from his chats with arriving suppliers and his pacing back and forth with mobile phone in hand.
He began with a small cafeteria, but then on December 10, 2010, he opened the restaurant beside it . His plans did not stop there.
"We also have a jewellery repair shop and in two or three years I want to build a place in the back to rent out rooms," he said.
Like the rest of Cuba, many of Guaimaro's residents have family living abroad, especially in Florida, and as luck would have it, U.S. President Barack Obama lifted restrictions on Cuban Americans visiting their homeland just a few months before the Magno opened for business.
Over the recent holidays the town – where legs, bicycles and horse-drawn buggies are the main form of transportation – was dotted with rental cars, many of them driven by visiting Cuban Americans who wanted to treat their relatives and friends to a nice meal while out on the town.
There was only one place to go – the Magno, which has become a sort of destination restaurant that is well known in the area .
"December was by far the best month we have had," Mayedo said.
His wife Yaima Lopez helps run the Magno, while his aunt, a retired state economist, takes care of the books. Two cousins, with some cash earned working in Angola, where thousands of Cubans work as doctors, construction workers and teachers, lent him the seed money.
"I'm paying them back little by little, but they don't pressure me," he said.
The hardest times were when Mayedo waited for his clientele to build up and worried he might go bankrupt.
"Like all businesses the first year or two are the most difficult. And this is the countryside, not the capital where there is more demand. Here we depend on the people who pass by on the highway," he said.
THE TAX MAN COMETH
As his business has grown, Mayedo has added eight full-time employees to help operate it.
The biggest challenge has been training a workforce that is disciplined and pays attention to details, he said.
Mayedo said he has had no serious problems with the government, is grateful for the reforms underway and believes they are here to stay.
"I thank them for giving us the opportunity to demonstrate to ourselves that we are capable of doing this well," he said.
"No state can subsidize an entire population, it is impossible. Furthermore, we provide jobs, pay taxes and help the economy in a big way."
Mayedo doubted he would become a millionaire any time soon because, despite the reforms, there are still limits.
"The system is designed to allow us to keep living, not become rich. But yes, my life will keep improving," he said.
In a land where everyone worked for the state and there was no income tax until recently, one is now being levied on hundreds of thousands of small businesses and farms that have appeared due to Raul Castro's reforms.
Mayedo said his aunt was preparing his first income tax return even as he spoke.
Now that was something to worry about at a sliding scale of up to 50 percent of earnings, Mayedo admitted, but better to pay 50 percent of earnings than no tax on no earnings at all, he said with a shrug.
(Editing by Jeff Franks and Philip Barbara)
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/11/uk-cuba-entrepreneur-idUSLNE80A00Y20120111
Have Cubans Lost Their Rebeliousness?
Have Cubans Lost Their Rebeliousness?January 10, 2012Haroldo Dilla Alfonso*
HAVANA TIMES, Jan 10 — Recently I read one of Yoani Sanchez's incisive articles stating that Cubans have had their capacity for rebellion rooted out.
Her statement alluded to the inability of Cuban society to produce a socio-political rebellious response similar to the ones that occurred at different times with the Czechs, the East Germans and the Russians themselves. Certainly, this question is nestled in the minds of many people who are interested in the issue of Cuba – and I'm no exception.
For fifty years, Cubans — as members of a very liberal Western society, and as a people who waged enough wars and revolts to fill several history books — have stoically endured an authoritarian political regime, a true dictatorship over their basic needs (here I recall Agnes Heller), which in the past twenty years has been an economy characterized by chronic shortages.
This makes me wonder about what's the exact meaning of this surgical removal of our rebelliousness of which Yoani speaks.
As we are in the New Year, when we're always allowed a few extra frivolities, I would like to share some speculation about that subject.
Above all, I don't think they extirpated the capacity for rebelliousness of post-revolutionary Cuban society but instead, they created a model devoid of it.
In other words, the society we know today is the result of a fatal siphoning off that (in the beginning) not only kicked the bourgeois class out of the country, but also a very considerable part of the middle class. In this same way, it destroyed not only the political right wing but also the center and a significant portion of the left.
What remained was an amorphous and disorganized mass of the population subjected to the aesthetically pleasing but confusing concept of "the people." Moreover, they were led by a very radical left with no more of a commitment to democracy than to the virtues of their own power and to the applause of those entangled in the even more confusing "worker-peasant alliance."
In such an asymmetric condition, the "dictators of the proletariat" enjoyed a unique position to engage in social engineering that substantially altered the social composition of Cuba. Moreover, they did their best (Sam Farber brilliantly demonstrates this in his latest book) to omit the nurseries of nonconformity.
The popular masses benefited from the many social programs. In fact, they experienced a powerful surge in social mobility (I don't think that mobility was as intense in any other period in the history of Cuba), which undoubtedly helped to create areas of consensus.
However, sociologically this would have worked to produce a higher grade of social subjects and an increase in their capacity for rebelliousness; this means the capacity that Yoani mentioned should have grown.
But this didn't happen, since at the same time the Cuban economy began to be heavily subsidized — with this continuing for nearly two decades — based on its political relationship with Moscow. This allowed Cuban authorities to govern with considerable autonomy with respect to society and to the disastrous economy that they themselves had generated.
Ultimately, the material reproduction of society and the authoritarian political system didn't depend on internal variables but on political relations with the Soviet Union.
In addition, in their relationship with society they were in an excellent position to produce a credible ideology that pointed to an unstoppable march hand in hand with the "laws of history" and their "indestructible friendship" with the Soviets.
This ideology, as Alejandro Armengol has rightly noted, was not super-structural, but structural, as they still would like it to remain – and effectively it is for the hard-core supporters, certainly the minority, but enough to demonstrate government control of the streets, while the vast majority of people remain waiting in a perennial state of wait and see.
The collapse of the Soviet bloc was a hard economic blow, but it could be assimilated by a rigid system of political and police control. Cuban authorities, masters in the art of saying the same thing and the opposite without blushing, blamed the CIA for the whole mess and shifted all of their sermonizing onto a nationalist tack.
Again they got the best of their antagonists: Cuban-American politicians and the Republican right.
They produced the best case of social mobility that they could come up with: a new migratory stampede that within a few days put several tens of thousands of young Cubans on American soil and forced the US to renegotiate a more favorable immigration accord.
When the economy began to recover and new subsidies started coming [from Venezuela] in the name of Simon Bolivar, the population had already stopped growing and had even begun a dangerous decline, which constitutes the most disturbing sign of the contemporary Cuban situation.
In other words, when the rebellious capacity was growing and had better prospects for functioning, the government clamped down on it with such power that people decided to protest with oars. In fact, they only protested in the streets — for a few hours — when they lost hope in being able to paddle away.
If there's something that needs to be recognized about Cuba's leaders, particularly Fidel Castro, it's their unparalleled talent to retain power, whether by adding, subtracting, multiplying or dividing.
They have been the receivers of a macabre combination of Stalinism along with tyrannical and Mafioso-like "caudilloism" – all seasoned with the Jesuit charm that the commander learned in his Belen boarding school. With this they have offset their remarkable economic disabilities, seduced Tyrians and Trojans, and survived allies and enemies alike.
My doubt or question is whether we are at the inevitable end of the incantation or if the Cuban elite has the new resources to accommodate themselves. On the one hand, the state-society relationship has lost its protective function and is vanishing in the aisles of the marketplace, social inequality and the impoverishment of a very high percentage of the population.
In addition, society is generationally different from that which frantically applauded the entrance of the barbudos (the bearded guys) into Havana and cheered Cuban-Soviet friendship, whose basis took the form of three meals a day.
While it's true that the regime has a strong ability to control repression, and the arrival of the Scarabeo 9 oil rig can lead to a new era of relative prosperity, I don't think this will be sufficient to reproduce the pattern of fissure-proof subordination that was clamped down so tightly on the capacity for rebellion.
This is especially so since in any circumstance the only way that the economy can function under the new conditions — including with accumulation for the benefit of the emerging the middle class — is to defragment markets and close the most exclusive legal and political gaps.
While none of this automatically produces democracy, it does create a more open setting, especially in a liberal Western society like Cuba.
In any case, everything I've said is obviously a hypothetical position, useful only for discussion.
Especially for those of us who from very different political positions and desiring a change without violent disruptions, are convinced that changes organized from above without pressure from below and dependent solely on the will of the elite can only lead to "updated" authoritarianism and the recycling of political and cultural mediocrity.
This is what the so-called orderly transition involves, lots of order but little transition.
The capacity for rebellion is essential.
—
(*) A Havana Times translation (from the Spanish original) published by Cubaencuentro.
The Paths of the General / Luis Felipe Rojas
The Paths of the General / Luis Felipe RojasLuis Felipe Rojas, Translator: Raul G.
This article was written by Luis Felipe Rojas for 'Diario de Cuba'. It has been re-posted on this blog:
In regards to the year which has just begun, it is evident that the directions of the Cuban government are like forked transit lines. With more desires to give orders to its members than to implement any sort of political economy, on January 28th they will hold the First National Conference of the Communist Party (PCC).
Towards the end of March the General-President will receive the Vatican authorities, rosary and timbrel at hand. And during the middle of the year he will once again be in the limelight, with our without the fulfillment of promises. Cuba will once again see how dreams and demands dissipate.
On a tour which was expected to come sooner or later, the Castro leadership has gone up against itself. Against the inflated staffs, administrative corruption, and economic inefficiency. The three whips of Cuban society have been exposed in numerous public meetings: the communist congress and the ordinary session of the National Assembly.
We would have to see if the Cuban technocrats are willing to change their mentality and cast away their furies against the same projects as always. While the historic direction holds tight to the old art of snapping orders and marching, thousands of Cubans try to improve their lives selling what they themselves cultivate, carrying out service jobs or applying their talents to new technologies.
However, enthusiasms aside, the penalization of difference still weighs heavy over the heads of the majority of Cubans, as well as the rake against free association and the establishment of unions, and laws like Social Dangerousness which seem to belong in the Middle Ages.
Without being able to defend their most basic rights, the Cuban citizenry, since the beginning of the millennium, has been trapped in the delicacies of capitalism and civilization which has been placed before them. They produce foreign currency, which they cannot freely enjoy. They substitute imports with medical services which they can rarely enjoy and, on top of that, they carry the weight of errors committed by the senile leadership.
The more moderate forces among the rulers (which are not always visible) opt for a change of tactics and for a reasonable strategy which would favor the betterment of the citizen. A consensus of the majority of workers has demonstrated the weariness produced by slogans and inefficiency of promises.
The criticisms of Raul Castro and the dissidents of the government are going to crash against the accommodated tendency of the bureaucrats. Attempting to impregnate from stamps of eternal solidarity with Cubans, the maximum leadership deprives them of health services which are obliged to serve their third-world contemporaries.
At this point, many are asking themselves about the relationship between the statistic offered by Cuba of 4.9 children who have died per each thousand born alive, and the fact of not publishing the statistics of the budget cuts in the public health sector. Will this statistic be upheld despite the cuts? As for the popular sophism of 'tossing the house out through the window', there is also the fact that there are many necessities, due to a weakened system of primary attention.
Upon being asked if he was a militant (of the Communist Party, of course), a well known professor for the University of Oriente responded, "No, I am the culprit". The joke has transcended university property and illustrates the disillusion of that 'minority' (in the words of Rafael Rojas) which, in regards to political strength, has transmuted to another social ill.
Translated by Raul G.
9 January 2011
Open Letter from the Writer Ángel Santiesteban-Prats to the New President of Spain / Ángel Santiesteban
Open Letter from the Writer Ángel Santiesteban-Prats to the New President of Spain / Ángel SantiestebanAngel Santiesteban, Translator: Unstated Havana, 20 December 2011
President Mariano Rajoy, I turn to you on the day my daughter celebrates her birthday. Just thinking of the Cuban young people, I decided to write you these humble and sincere words without standing on ceremony other than to offer you well-deserved congratulations, and to cry for the young of my country whose only horizon is the Straits of Florida which cause so many deaths. But not before giving you a small account of the last two governments of my country and the impact they have had on us.
Since the absence in power of Spain's People's Party, three elections back, the freedom of Cubans has been banished. We quickly received a half-communist minister representing the PSOE (Socialist Workers Party), who came to negotiate with the Castro brothers. Since then, the silence and Spanish president Zapatero's complicity threw its dark mantle over the Cuban archipelago. The days when the freedom of the people was more important to Spain than relations with a tyrant, were long gone.
That complicity with which the Cultural Attache welcomed those of us with the intention to participate in some literary contest in Spain, and the envelopes full of stories and hopes, ended. From that time on we no longer received the latest published books from the Iberian peninsula, nor the journal Encuentro de la Cultura Cubana which had provided us with the latest cultural events in the world and, especially, in the culture of our diaspora forbidden on Cuban soil.
The literary, essay and photography contest thought up by the Spanish embassy, which was juried and where I was told there was no pressure because they would award the prize to some irreverent text despite the political system that scorns us and exists in this country, only got as far as a call for entries. The official policy of support for marginalized artists vanished. We also lost the profound and hard work of the Hispanic-American Center because the dictatorship closed it, not wanting there to be a space for the cultural freedom it supported.
Then, the meeting with the ungainly ambassador of whom I only remember his name "Lazarus," and who joked about a Bible passage, "Lazarus, arise and walk," because the Lazarus sent to us only came to lie down at the feet of the dictator. And the following meeting for Columbus Day, which we had celebrated in the ambassador's residence for many years, and Lazarus just read our group what his work plan was going to be, which was "nothing," making him the second Government of the Island. Since then we haven't gone back despite continuing to receive an invitation.
Months later the Ambassadors of the European Union wanted a meeting-dialogue with Cuban writers in the residence of the Ambassador of Austria, which chaired the EU at the time. Attending were Leonardo Padura, Amado del Pino, Pedro Juan Gutiérrez, Reinaldo Montero and me. Each gave his vision of the social reality.
Some Ambassadors wondered about the relationship between Venezuela and Cuba, and thought that perhaps, as expressed by the Spanish Ambassador, that starting with a substantion improvement in the economy, there would arise an improvement in individual freedoms. He was hoping for better times for Cuba, the raising of the national economy and social freedoms.
When I intervened I said that with reference to the possibility of "economic improvement", I found myself pessimistic, given that the years of dictatorship had demonstrated gross mismanagement of the assets of the People, and that in the unlikely event that Venezuela became what the Union Soviet and the rest of the socialist camp had been for Cuba, it would be disastrous for individual liberties, as rather than being strengthened, repression would also increase.
That the Ruler (at the time it was Fidel Castro, now it is his brother, but it has always been the same last name), had ceded his harsh dictatorship from the Special Period, when he lost credibility and followers, but there was a return to economic consolidation, which I doubted we could say for certain that it would sharpen the repression, censorship and imprisonment of opponents of the government.
After the meeting ended, while having refreshments, I was approached by Ambassador Lazaro, who told me light-heartedly, "Don't be so pessimistic." I gave him a look as impotence threatened to overcome me. "Sir," I said, "how is it possible that you dare to ask for optimism from one of the members of the third generation that this process has consumed without any benefit. Fidel Castro is a human crushing machine."
The ambassador wanted to escape but I stopped him: "Never," I pronounced, "have I seen the Cuban State prosper, not in economic matters nor in individual liberties, and unfortunately we two are going to be alive to see it."
The Ambassador raised his arms and walked away. We never met again. I did not accept his invitations. Wherever he finds himself today, he should remember the words that without being an expert in political and social matters, were offered to him, a career diplomat, most disadvantaged by our forecasts, with his failure as Ambassador and his role in a boring and submissive political party, so much so, that his own workers in the Spanish embassy in Havana let us know that they had a room full of the journal Encuentro de la Cultura Cubana, which they couldn't distribute because the government had forbidden it in secret negotiations.
In those two governments of Zapatero, we have suffered the shamelessness of both presidencies (Zapatero-Fidel and Raul Castro) and their minions. Supposed achievements in the matter of the prisoners of conscience have only served them to be accomplices in helping to take the lid off the pot and relieve the pressure and thus avoid a social explosion on the island, to procure some respite for a process that is asphyxiating at times, an that resorts to strategies intended to improve its international image, award accomplices, and ultimately ultimately extend a system which the population does not believe in, such as releasing the prisoners of conscience to Spain which agreed to receive them as political refugees, but which disengaged from them after their arrival and haphazardly left them in the hands of God. The Master of Ceremonies of this sizable circus was Foreign Minister Miguel Moratinos.
In the end they demonstrated that releasing the prisoners was not done for humanitarian but for political reasons.I also pray for them and I urge you to provide them the place they deserve after suffering persecution, torture and imprisonment, it would be very kind of you to stop this escalation of agony, and end something that started ill. Ii is in your hands to do it.
Of course, we know that while the Popular Party has won, it doesn't mean it will resolve the immense problems that have shaken Spain, much less solve the dilemma of the Cubans. What we are sure of is that at least you, President Mariano Rajoy, have extended a hand in solidarity and know how to take the measure of a dictatorship that is dying, but that even in its death throes, keeps kicking and is willing to take the lives of those who confront it.
Recently Cubans have lost a friend, intellectual and former Czech President Vaclav Havel, but God has provided us with you. Having called the Czech writer to His side, he is right to leave this task in your hands.
With humility we simply ask you, President Rajoy, for an ambassador who respects us and offers a place to the thoughtful opposition, dedicated and determined to achieve the freedoms inherent in being human.
Welcome!
Sincerely,
Ángel Santiesteban-Prats
Translator's note: Slight changes have been made in this letter for English-speaking readers who may not know what positions those named hold or held in Spain and Cuba — they have been added.
December 26 2011
Housing market blooms in Cuban provinces
Housing market blooms in Cuban provincesBy Marc FrankSANTIAGO DE CUBA, Cuba | Mon Jan 9, 2012 3:53pm EST
(Reuters) – Hundreds of handwritten signs stuck on doorways and in windows announce "se vende" or "for sale" in provincial cities and towns across Cuba as the island's nascent housing market begins to bloom.
Buyers walk the streets looking at homes the whereabouts of which were passed along by word of mouth as sellers outside of Havana have limited access to the Internet or other means to advertise their sales.
There are hovels and there are splendid little places tucked between crumbling buildings. There are two-story homes in need of repair and a few in immaculate condition. Some places go for the equivalent of a few thousand dollars, others for much more.
Buying and selling homes was banned for decades in Cuba. The best one could do was trade dwellings in what Cubans call a "permuta" and expand or decrease the size of where you lived by a single room.
That all changed when the ban was lifted in November, along with much of the previous paperwork and bureaucratic tangles, though Cubans can still own just one home and vacation place and non-resident foreigners are excluded from the market.
The measure appears to be the most popular yet as President Raul Castro, who replaced his ailing brother Fidel in 2008, works to reform the Soviet-style economy and gradually lifts some of the more onerous restrictions on people's daily lives.
Trading one's home was a nightmarish process that could take months and even years under the old system, and often required bribes and under-the-table payments.
The new system requires a simple notary and payment through the bank and appears to be working relatively well according to more than a dozen people selling their homes from one end of the island to the other.
"The new law is really good because there are people who get divorced, or who have money but no place to live, or live in a big place and want a smaller one, or have big families in a little place and want something larger and now with this law they can meet their needs much more easily," Tania Vigaroa, in the process of selling her home in eastern Holguin, said.
Most of the sellers say they would like to move to a smaller home and that permutas plus payments are now to difficult to find because people prefer to buy or sell.
In neighboring Santiago de Cuba the other day a haggard looking receptionist at the San Pedro notary office, where the waiting room was full, said the three notaries working there had no time to talk.
"This place has been overflowing since they changed the law, every day is the same," said receptionist Milaidy, who asked that her last name not be used, adding there were three other offices in the city.
Most sellers have become used to strangers on the prowl for a home. They are a hospitable lot, welcoming the passerby to come in for a look.
"I'm asking $55,000. The house has three rooms, two bathrooms, a big back yard, kitchen, dining room and living room and this is right near the center of town," said Jose Ramirez in the city of Ciego de Avila, in central Cuba.
"A number of people have come by so we will see. It's a respectable sum, but my daughter was recently divorced and lives across town and I want to be near her for support. There is a house over there that costs exactly the same amount," he said.
Some 60 miles to the east, in the city of Camaguey, bicycle-taxi driver Roberto Sosa says "no problem," when asked to peddle the Cuban version of a rickshaw around town for a look at what's on the market.
OVERSEAS INTEREST
An hour and five homes later one place catches the eye on Virgin Street. The neighborhood needs a plaster and paint job and the road needs paving, but the half-block-long, five bedroom single story house, freshly painted and with new tile floors, is splendid.
"We want $35,000 and have a possible buyer, but she is checking with her family in Miami," said the owner's son, who gave his name only as Santiago.
Bicitaxi peddler Sosa wasn't surprised.
"Most of the houses sold are (being bought) with the help of family abroad, if not it wouldn't be possible because their value is going up a lot now," he said, pointing out most local residents make only the equivalent of $20 or $30 per month.
Emilio Morales in Miami wasn't surprised either.
"A number of law firms, mainly here in the United States and Spain, have already called asking about the law for clients who want to know how they can buy property in Cuba," the former marketing strategist for CIMEX, one of the largest state-run trading and retail corporations on the island, said in a telephone interview.
Morales, now CEO of The Havana Consulting Group, a startup company specializing in potential Cuban markets, including residential real estate, said there was plenty of interest.
"Here in Miami there are a lot of people interested in buying property in Cuba for diverse reasons, some to start restaurants, cafeterias or other businesses and others to have a place to retire and live out their old age," he said.
(Editing by Jeff Franks and Cynthia Osterman)
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/09/us-cuba-house-idUSTRE8081ZS20120109
The Castros and the Kims: Historic Parallels / Iván García
The Castros and the Kims: Historic Parallels / Iván GarcíaIván García, Translator: Unstated
Autocrats are clones of the same litter. They're not separated by ideologies, what joins them is an unhealthy ambition for power. Each and every one of modern dictators consider themselves enlightened. Types essential on the national map. Founding Fathers. Irreplaceable. They could not be more narcissistic. Egos more than enough. The nation is their private estate.
They arise in periods of bad governance, economic crises, wars of decolonization and political instability. They usually have a foolproof formula under their arm to catapult the country forward. When in the embryonic state they are very popular. Humans need icons. Heroes. Heavy-handed leaders.
Then the despots come through the back door. In this 21st century, with Internet, social networking and digitization, and there are few left. You can count them on your fingers. In Equatorial Guinea, an unpresentable man named Teodoro Obiang has all the makings of a dictator.
The monarchies of the Middle East and Morocco are another variation of dictatorships. Natural dynasties. By blood, the throne belongs to a family. And there is nothing, or little, you can do about it. Already in the 18th century in Europe there were monarchies, but after the French Revolution republican forms arose and the kings and princes were mere decorative objects. Dedicated to works of charity or creating foundations. Certainly one of them, the son of King Juan Carlos, Iñaki Urdangarin, is embroiled in a corruption scandal.
There are people who consider themselves superior intellectually to lead the destiny of a nation. It may be a gene to be discovered.
The guy with ways of a dictator knows the league. He does not like to be out of power. Neither stands. They make up laws, such as Hugo Chavez and Daniel Ortega, for indefinite re-election. The reckless one of Barina went to the executive for votes. Those same votes would put him back in the house.
Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung took over the throne by bullets. Castro overthrew the illegal and tyrannical government of Fulgencio Batista. Sung was boosted by Moscow. Military preparations in the USSR. A golden age for Stalin after World War II where the map began to change colors and the Red Army imposed Marxist socialism by force of their T-34 tanks.
It has always intrigued me whether these two Third World autocrats had among their purposes to remain in power. Perhaps they move, for a time, fair ideals to build a decent way of life for its citizens. But betting on the wrong horse.
The communism of Marx has been inefficient everywhere in the world where it has been established. Never mind that the country has wealth or not. Within a few years, the economy and the nation go adrift. It is, no doubt, an unnatural system. That goes against the human soul. A slapstick.
An autocrat never acknowledges he's wrong. Right there is where their pathological cases are slated to be part of medical studies. Castro, for example, is never wrong. Others are wrong.
Kim Il Sung was the only God allowed in North Korea. He turned the nation into a cult. His ego was so overwhelmed that he invented a new philosophy, Juche.
Yes, because some dictators want to go down in history as thinkers and righteous men. Gaddafi, the jackal of Tripoli, between cocaine and sexual abuse of the young, gave birth to a pamphlet called The Green Book.
Fidel Castro wasn't given to outline a new social philosophy. But he dipped his oar into all fields. He is the most knowledgeable about cattle, sugarcane, bananas, dams, cyclones … And baseball: the preparation of the Cuban team to play against the Baltimore Orioles in 1999 was designed by the commander. He was master of everything and the student of nothing.
Kim Il Sung idiot of the unhappy Koreans with a cult of personality more potent than a narcotic. Statues everywhere and him dressed in grey with the stamp of a leader on the lapel. After these autocrats a change doesn't necessarily come.
In North Korea Kim Jong Il, the son of Sung. Another madman. North Korean media said, in two years he wrote 6 operas and read 180,000 books. He used to play 11 holes of golf on one drive. His writings were released daily by the state radio. It is said that such was his passion for film, he kept 20,000 films under lock and key, and later, maybe in his cups, he ordered the kidnap of a couple of directors of South Korea to make a personal film.
He liked to eat lobster with silver chopsticks while his people starved and fell like flies on the streets of Pyongyang. A rotten collection.
He ordered the kidnapping of Japanese citizens. Downed planes in flight. And to prove he was a tough guy when he came to the throne in 1993 he ordered a terrorist act in Rangoon that cost the lives of 17 South Koreans.
Not content with his mischief, he produced half a dozen nuclear bombs. He made North Korea a rogue state. After his death on December 17, he'd hand-picked its favorite son Kim Jong Un to continue the communist dynasty. The child knows little: 28 years, fat, and fan of the NBA.
The parallels between Castro and Kim are remarkable at the time of passing power to his family. In Cuba, now, General Raul Castro (another hobby of autocrats is to get many stars on the epaulet), rides to the rescue and attempts to repair the damage to the economy.
But Castro II, 80, is as old as his brother, 85. On the island, the average age of life for men is 76 years. Both are past it. The question is whether in these parts after the two die, their offspring and hand-picked relatives will touch the presidential chair.
We must wait. Meanwhile, Cuba was among the few countries that declared three days of national mourning for the death "of Comrade Kim Jong Il." Autocrats are part of a club. They play in another league.
Video: 1986. Fidel Castro visits the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. At the foot of the stairs of the plane he is received by Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il's father and the grandfather of Kim Jong Un.
January 5 2012
Reformas de Raúl, VI Congreso del PCC y resultados (II-Final)
Economía, Cambios
Reformas de Raúl, VI Congreso del PCC y resultados (II-Final)
Análisis de las reformas económicas que lleva a cabo el gobierno cubano, realizado por Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Catedrático Distinguido Emérito de Economía de la Universidad de Pittsburgh. Segunda parte y final
Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Pittsburgh | 05/01/2012
Política social
El aumento de ingresos a la seguridad social podría significar una fuente adicional de fondos si realmente se expandiese notablemente la afiliación de cuentapropistas. Pero hay que tener en cuenta el impacto negativo en el ingreso por la caída en el empleo y de las cotizaciones en el sector estatal, donde solo un cuarto de los empleados cotiza y es difícil extender la contribución por los bajos salarios (Mesa-Lago, 2010b). Para elevar el valor real de los salarios habría que generar primero un aumento considerable en la producción y la productividad, lo cual requiere reformas más profundas que las hasta ahora implementadas o aprobadas en el Congreso.
Respecto al gasto social, el economista cubano Pavel Vidal (2011) recomienda que la asistencia social se incremente de manera rápida, sin demoras, pues de lo contrario "habría un costo social muy grande". De ese modo, los grupos vulnerables deben ser identificados y deben crearse nuevos mecanismos, así como formar el personal para ello. Un acuerdo del Congreso prescribió que la asistencia social la recibieran "las personas que realmente la necesitan", lo cual si se hace con la focalización adecuada excluiría a beneficiarios que no están en situación de pobreza y así se ahorrarían recursos. Por otra parte, se dispuso "eliminar prestaciones que pueden ser asumidas (…) por los familiares de las personas beneficiadas", pero la factibilidad de esta acción es dudosa en vista de las necesidades generalizadas de la población.
Por último, el Congreso no sentó las reglas básicas para la compraventa de viviendas ni eliminó la permuta, aunque estipuló que se flexibilizaría (véase más adelante el análisis de la ley promulgada sobre esto). Además, durante la presentación ante la Asamblea Nacional de los resultados económicos del año 2010 y el plan de la economía para 2011, el ministro de Economía, Marino Murillo (2010), anunció la abolición del precio subsidiado a materiales de construcción vendidos a la población para la construcción de sus viviendas, debido a la venta ilegal de dichos materiales con enorme ganancia para quienes especulan con ellos (hay que recordar que el precio subsidiado de un bloque es el 10 % del precio oficial). Esta medida es fiscalmente correcta, pero perjudicará al sector más pobre y de bajos ingresos, ya que no tendrá acceso a dichos materiales a un precio diez veces mayor.
Resultados de las reformas y ajustes aplicados
Aunque el modelo económico aún no ha sido "actualizado", tanto la experiencia histórica como las limitaciones antes analizadas generan dudas sobre su éxito. En la presentación del informe central al VI Congreso, Raúl Castro (2011) anunció que el proceso tomaría un quinquenio y de paso amonestó: "lo que aprobemos en este Congreso no puede sufrir la misma suerte que los acuerdos de los congresos anteriores, casi todos olvidados sin haberse cumplido". Por su parte, Pavel Vidal (2011) ha expresado: "No veo un cambio estructural importante en (…) la planificación [hay] que otorgar mayor espacio al mercado (…) regulándolo con instrumentos indirectos de penalización y estímulos, no [actualizar] un sistema centralizado que ha demostrado una y mil veces ser ineficiente en Cuba y fuera de Cuba". El modelo de socialismo de mercado chino o vietnamita, que otorga un papel mayor al mercado y al sector privado, ha dado excelentes resultados por decenios. Si se hubiese seguido este modelo, adaptado a las necesidades cubanas, hubiese habido mayor probabilidad de éxito.
Respecto al usufructo, a mediados del año 2010, el ministro de Economía, Marino Murillo, expresó su preocupación por la falta de resultados productivos. Por su parte, Pedro Olivera, director general del Centro Nacional de Control de la Tierra del Ministerio de Agricultura, alegó que la evaluación del impacto en la producción tomaría dos años. Pero la producción agrícola disminuyó el 3 % en el año 2010, con resultados negativos en la mayoría de los productos. El impacto más grave se produjo en la producción del tabaco en rama, el arroz, los frijoles y la mayoría de las frutas, con caídas entre
el 19 % y el 27 %. Después encontramos los cítricos y las hortalizas, con descensos entre el 16 % y el 17 %, y luego los huevos y los tubérculos, que disminuyeron entre 0 % y 3 %. Tan solo aumentaron un 2 % las cabezas de ganado, y entre el 5 % y el 6 % la producción de leche y la cosecha del maíz.
Las cifras preliminares del primer trimestre del año 2011 muestran una reducción en la superficie cultivada del sector privado (con poquísimas excepciones), aunque se aprecia un aumento en la producción de la mayoría de los cultivos respecto al deprimido año 2010 (ONE, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c)[5]. Por el contrario, estadísticas también preliminares del período enero-septiembre de 2011, comparadas con el mismo período en 2010, indican que la superficie cultivada total y del Estado se contrajo, pero la privada se había expandido, especialmente en cítricos (un 94 %), aves, ganado porcino y alubias (entre un 42 % y un 49 %). La producción agropecuaria creció un 7,2 %, aunque con diferencias notables: los mayores aumentos se registraron en el arroz (un 64 %) y las alubias (un 62 %), mientras que las peores caídas fueron para los cítricos (un 29 %) y las patatas (un 14 %). La desagregación de la producción por sector demuestra que el sector estatal tuvo un mal resultado y lo opuesto ocurrió en el sector privado. Por ejemplo, las cabezas de ganado disminuyeron el 8 % en el estatal, y crecieron el 92 % en el privado; mientras que las proporciones respectivas en otros productos fueron las siguientes: cítricos, caída del 20 % y aumento del 94 %; tubérculos, caída del 14 % y aumento del 18 %; plátano, caída del 29 % y aumento del 10 %; hortalizas, caída del 19 % y aumento del 7 %; y alubias, aumentos del 6 % y del 43 %, respectivamente (ONE, 2011d).
Estas cifras preliminares adolecen de contradicciones, pues aunque se contrajo la superficie sembrada no dejó de aumentar la producción, lo cual sólo podría explicarse por una mayor eficiencia y por el uso de fertilizantes, herbicidas, etc. Además, ONE define al sector privado como de campesinos no organizados en cooperativas que cultivan tierras no estatales, por lo que parece excluir a los usufructuarios, aunque estos tampoco se identifican con los sectores estatal y cooperativo. Hay que esperar a las estadísticas completas del año 2011 y a la desagregación de la superficie y producción usufructuarias, pero las cifras disponibles indican que después de la caída en 2010 de la producción agrícola, esta aumentó en 2011 en el sector privado y disminuyó o se estancó en el sector estatal. Aun con este adelanto, la producción agrícola en 2011 estaba muy por debajo de la existente en el año 2005, y peor aún respecto al año 1989, antes de la crisis.
En las reformas agrarias de China y Vietnam, el Estado también retuvo la propiedad de la tierra pero, a diferencia de Cuba, dichos países otorgaron contratos de duración indefinida, y dieron libertad a los agricultores para plantar lo que deseasen, vender los productos a quienes quisiesen y fijar su precio de acuerdo con la oferta y la demanda. Bajo estas políticas, se consiguió un enorme y rápido incremento de la producción agrícola, se alcanzó la autosuficiencia alimentaria y se generaron excedentes que luego fueron exportados. A modo de ejemplo, Vietnam es hoy el primer exportador arrocero del mundo, y vende a Cuba la mayor parte del arroz que se consume en la Isla.
En cuanto al trabajo por cuenta propia, los resultados no han sido muy halagüeños. A fines del año 2010 se contabilizaban 147.400 personas registradas, solo 3.600 más que en 2009, aunque el programa había comenzado a implementarse a principios de octubre de 2010 (ONE, 2011c). En el discurso de clausura en la Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular, el 18 de diciembre de 2010, Raúl Castro (2010) apremió al Partido y al Gobierno para que facilitaran el avance del cuentapropismo, llamó a "no generar estigmas ni prejuicios contra ellos, ni mucho menos demonizarlos" y pidió "modificar la apreciación negativa existente". Pero a pesar de estos augurios favorables, el 28 de febrero de 2011 se anunció que no se cumpliría la meta de la primera etapa, y tampoco se fijó un plazo para alcanzarla, salvo vagas referencias al plan quinquenal 2011-2014. A fines de octubre de 2011, el Gobierno reveló que solo se había despedido al 10 % del millón de trabajadores que debía ser sacado del sector estatal en diciembre de ese año. También informó que se habían creado 190.600 trabajos por cuenta propia adicionales, es decir, un 76 % de la meta de los 250.000 previstos, además de que dos tercios de las actividades registradas como nuevas se estaban realizando anteriormente de forma ilegal (Arreola, 2011a y b).
Entre el 1 de octubre de 2010, cuando se empezó a aplicar el programa, y el 30 de abril de 2011, justo después del VI Congreso, se habían concedido 221.839 licencias, de las que habría que descontar 27.000 devoluciones por parte de personas que no pudieron llevar a cabo su desempeño. Pero el 68 % de los nuevos trabajadores que accedieron a licencias por cuenta propia no tenía relación laboral previa con el Estado, lo que significa que ya eran antiguos desempleados que hacía tiempo que se habían desvinculado de las actividades controladas por el mismo. Además, el 16 % de las nuevas licencias fueron otorgadas a jubilados o trabajadores estatales, con lo cual el resultado final indicó que solo 35.494 personas, alrededor de otro 16 %, eran en realidad desempleados recientes tras el proceso de despidos masivos. Entre las razones para justificar la lentitud en los despidos y la creación de empleos privados se mencionaron la resistencia de los administradores estatales, la exigencia de documentos y trámites no legales a los cuentapropistas, así como la dilación excesiva para conceder licencias sanitarias (Granma [28.02.2011, 17.05.2011 y 21.05.2011] y Juventud Rebelde [19.03.2011]).
Tras un análisis de la evolución del proceso de despidos y del trabajo por cuenta propia, el Consejo de Ministros aprobó en mayo de 2011 varios ajustes: 1) congeló todas las plazas estatales y extendió el cronograma de despidos sin fijar fecha; 2) permitió la contratación de trabajadores no familiares en las 178 ocupaciones aprobadas, y aumentó de 20 a 50 el número de sillas autorizadas en restaurantes privados (paladares), a la vez que facilitó que restaurantes estatales con baja actividad fueran arrendados a cuentapropistas; 3) suspendió el impuesto de utilización de la fuerza laboral en 2011 a los que contraten hasta 5 empleados, y también redujo cuotas mensuales o impuestos a varias actividades; 4) eliminó la obligatoriedad de afiliarse y cotizar a la seguridad social a mujeres de 60 o más años y a hombres de 65 o más; 5) asignó 14 millones de euros para asegurar la venta de mercancías a los cuentapropistas, pero dejó para el futuro la creación del mercado mayorista; 6) autorizó la actividad de agente de seguros; y 7) concedió a las embarazadas despedidas que no encontraran empleo la licencia de maternidad que antes perdían (Granma [17.05.2011 y 27.05.2011]). En septiembre de 2011 el Gobierno redujo las tasas de tributos mensuales a las personas que ofrecen hospedajes a cubanos y extranjeros, así como prometió que se extendería a otras ocupaciones el experimento de arriendo a trabajadores de peluquerías, barberías y salones de belleza. A comienzos de noviembre de 2011 el Consejo de Ministros anunció que habría nuevas cuotas de pagos de impuestos, sin mayor aclaración[6].
En el caso de la educación superior, se observa que la cantidad de alumnos matriculados en medicina, que aumentó un 61 % entre 2005 y 2010, había disminuido el 21 % en el curso 2010-2011. Esto significa un obstáculo para que se haga efectivo el acuerdo del Congreso para que la graduación de especialistas médicos cubra las necesidades del país y las que se generen por los compromisos internacionales. Por otra parte, el gasto en educación se redujo porque el número de universidades municipales había decrecido un 96 % entre 2009 y 2011, mientras que todas las escuelas de trabajadores sociales habían sido cerradas (ONE, 2011c).
Respecto al sistema de pensiones, la reforma del año 2008 se suponía que pospondría de 2015 a 2020 el momento en que habría más retirados que trabajadores entrantes en la fuerza laboral (Peláez, 2011). No obstante, dicha reforma no ha reducido de manera significativa el severo déficit del sistema, ya que para equilibrarlo en el año 2010 habría que haber subido hasta el 21 % la cotización actual del 12 % sobre el salario (pagada por las empresas), y en los años sucesivos ese porcentaje debería ir en aumento. Por otra parte, en abril de 2011 se habían registrado 198.511 personas en el régimen especial de la seguridad social, incluyendo a cuentapropistas que ejercían antes de iniciarse el proceso de extensión del trabajo privado (Granma [30.04.2011]). En cuanto a los gastos en asistencia social, si se hace una comparación con las cifras de los años 2006 a 2008, en 2010 estos gastos se redujeron un 39 %, el número de beneficiarios un 61 %, los adultos mayores con asistencia un 51 % y los beneficiarios de asistencia a domicilio un 67 % (ONE, 2011c). Estos severos recortes, unidos a la eliminación gradual de gratuidades y del racionamiento, más el acuerdo citado que restringe la ayuda a ciertos beneficiarios, perjudica a grupos vulnerables e implica una erosión en la red de protección social que es esencial en la reforma.
Referente a la vivienda, la construcción total de residencias cayó un 6% en el año 2010, mientras que la edificación de viviendas privadas se desplomó un 19% en el mismo año; la eliminación de subsidios a los materiales de construcción pudo ser la causa que provocó esa disminución mayor (ONE, 2011c). En este sentido, el grupo de población de bajos ingresos no puede comprar los materiales a precios diez veces superiores, por lo que se debería estudiar la posibilidad de ofrecer vivienda subsidiada para los grupos vulnerables. Una medida de gran envergadura fue la promulgación de la esperada ley de vivienda que entró en vigor el 10 de noviembre de 2011. La misma autoriza la compraventa de viviendas por parte de ciudadanos y extranjeros residentes permanentes en la Isla y permite a los compradores y vendedores fijar libremente el precio y mudarse cuando lo deseen. Además, autoriza las ventas y permutas de viviendas de cubanos que emigran definitivamente sin estar sometidas a la aprobación estatal. Se permite la donación de vivienda y la transferencia gratuita a los herederos familiares. La permuta subsiste, pero ahora es legal el pago de una compensación que antes se hacía de forma ilegal. Esta ley puede generar el capital que tanto necesita el sector privado para lanzar y expandir sus pequeños negocios, así como impulsar la reparación de las deterioradas viviendas existentes. También resuelve la situación de parejas divorciadas que son copropietarias de una vivienda al permitir su venta de mutuo acuerdo. Por otra parte, también contiene restricciones: la propiedad se limita a una residencia permanente y otra de veraneo o descanso (a fin de evitar la concentración de la propiedad); el financiamiento debe hacerse a través del Banco Central de Cuba, que obliga a pagar una licencia aún no determinada; se carga un impuesto del 6 % del valor de la compraventa (4 % en caso de permuta), y se establecen penas severas, incluso prisión, para aquellos que mienten sobre el valor real de sus viviendas (Ley general de la vivienda, 2011). Se especula que la autorización para tener una segunda casa de veraneo podría abrir un agujero legal para que cubanos emigrados compren viviendas a través de sus parientes en Cuba. Un potencial efecto indeseado de la ley puede ser el aumento de las desigualdades respecto a la vivienda entre la población, pues los que tengan más dinero comprarán casas en las mejores áreas y los que carezcan de recursos estarán condenados a permanecer en "solares" (una casa dividida entre muchos propietarios de pequeños habitáculos) de los peores barrios. Además, el propietario de una vivienda arrendada puede venderla y el arrendatario quedarse en la calle (Cave, 2011).
Otra disposición importante que entró en vigor en octubre de 2011 es la autorización de la compraventa de automóviles, de manera libre y en pesos nacionales, entre ciudadanos cubanos que viven en la Isla y extranjeros residentes permanentes; se incluyen los viejos coches estadounidenses anteriores a 1959 y los fabricados en la URSS, otorgados por razones de trabajo antes de 1990. Por su parte, el comprador puede tener más de un coche, y los artistas, deportistas, intelectuales y/o otros profesionales que hayan rendido servicios en el extranjero también pueden adquirir autos modernos comprados con autorización. Los cubanos y extranjeros residentes pueden comprar, cada cinco años, un auto nuevo con pesos convertibles o divisas a través de agencias comerciales o importarlos; los residentes extranjeros temporales pueden tener hasta dos coches durante su estadía (Regulaciones para la transmisión de vehículos de motor, 2011).
Las restricciones legales se aplican especialmente a la compra de coches modernos, con trabas burocráticas e inclusiones y exclusiones arbitrarias. Dicha compra debe tramitarse ante el gobierno regional, que a su vez hace una petición al Ministro de Transporte, y el permiso puede tardar hasta cuatro meses. El comprador debe demostrar que sus ingresos han sido obtenidos en servicios prestados al Estado. Asimismo, se les permite la compra de autos a intelectuales o artistas que reciban premios internacionales o derechos de autor a través de entidades oficiales, así como a trabajadores de la pesca, el tabaco, la marina mercante, las aerolíneas y la base naval de Guantánamo; pero se excluye a los receptores de remesas del exterior y a los microempresarios cuando esas son sus fuentes únicas de ingreso, además de a los profesionales de la salud que prestan servicios en Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua y Ecuador. La compraventa de autos puede ser gravada con tres impuestos: transporte, ingresos personales y transmisión de bienes y herencia. A los cubanos que emigran de forma definitiva, el Estado les confisca su auto, el cual transmite en propiedad a las personas que tienen derecho, aunque les pueden negar este derecho por razones de utilidad pública o interés social, de ahí que sea más restrictiva que en el caso de la vivienda (Regulaciones para la transmisión de vehículos de motor, 2011). El Estado cobra 21.000 euros por un Hyundai Accent nuevo, pero el mismo auto usado se vende por 22.000 euros, y el simple permiso de compra de un coche se revende por 7.500 euros, por lo que la ley no podrá impedir la especulación (Burnett, 2011).
¿Consenso o disenso en la dirigencia sobre las reformas?
Hasta el momento, las dos reformas estructurales principales que se pusieron en marcha no han logrado un éxito claro. En la reforma de la agricultura, a pesar de la cesión de tierras en usufructo, la producción agrícola cayó en 2010 y, aunque aumentó en 2011 en el sector privado, se desconoce si fue por los campesinos no afiliados a cooperativas o por los usufructuarios. En la reforma laboral se incumplió la meta de despidos, y la creación de empleos privados fue insuficiente, en gran medida debido a las trabas y los desincentivos impuestos. En cuanto a la "actualización" del modelo económico, con persistente predominio de la planificación centralizada y de la empresa estatal, 52 años de intentos fallidos para mejorar auguran un nuevo fracaso. La combinación de los despidos, la eliminación de gratuidades y el racionamiento, más los recortes sociales —incluyendo la esencial asistencia social— pueden provocar una situación peligrosa. Por último, la autorización de la compraventa de viviendas y automóviles son medidas muy positivas, aunque también repletas de restricciones que son demasiado recientes para evaluar sus efectos.
El interrogante crucial es saber el motivo por el que no fueron corregidas las fallas de las reformas durante los meses de debates previos a la celebración del VI Congreso, en los que participaron nueve millones de cubanos, o por parte de los 1.000 delegados que asistieron a dicho congreso. Tampoco se propusieron posibles soluciones en las reuniones de la Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular, o en el Comité Central del PCC y su Buró Político. Después del VI Congreso, y en vista de los pobres resultados de las reformas, el Consejo de Ministros hizo ajustes, especialmente en el trabajo por cuenta propia y la compraventa de viviendas y coches, pero aún persisten problemas fundamentales. La Conferencia Nacional del PCC, anunciada para la segunda mitad del año 2011, y pospuesta para enero del 2012, parece estar encaminada a determinar el papel del Partido y sus relaciones con el Gobierno (Castro, 2010), aunque quizás amplíe y profundice las reformas estructurales.
La eficacia de las reformas y de los acuerdos del VI Congreso está obstruida por objetivos contradictorios. Por un lado, se pretende aumentar la producción para reducir las importaciones y expandir las exportaciones, así como eliminar el empleo estatal excedente, y se reconoce el papel creciente del mercado y el sector privado. Pero, por el otro, se pone énfasis en el plan central, el control, la empresa estatal y los fuertes impuestos al sector privado que obstaculizan su desarrollo. A pesar de las reiteradas aseveraciones de Raúl Castro sobre la unidad en la dirigencia, los elementos analizados en este artículo indican que existe un disenso en la cúpula del poder, así como en los niveles intermedios. Mientras unos apoyan las reformas como única vía para mejorar el desempeño económico y social, para así salvar la revolución, otros se resisten a ellas por temor a desatar fuerzas que se escapen del control del régimen o porque la competencia privada amenace sus posiciones y privilegios. El resultado es un compromiso ineficaz e insostenible.
Con el diseño actual, las reformas podrían alcanzar mejoras modestas, pero mientras no se resuelva el disenso en la dirigencia para expandir y profundizar estas reformas, no se conseguirá resolver los problemas económicos y sociales fundamentales de Cuba. Dos alternativas se perfilan en el futuro: a) una lucha en la dirigencia para impulsar las reformas o b) la continuación del statu quo con el riesgo de provocar una mayor erosión económica y social de imprevisibles consecuencias. Desde aquí abrigo la esperanza en que la historia tome el primer derrotero y triunfen los reformadores.
[5] La producción industrial cayó el 2 % en 2010 (6% en electricidad, 11% en textiles y 33 % en zapatos; se estancó en puros y cemento); la producción de petróleo creció el 10 %, pero la de gas cayó el 7 % y también la de níquel (ONE, 2011c).[6] Noticias de la televisión cubana (02.11.2011).
Referencias bibliográficasARREOLA, Gerardo. "Cuba eliminó sólo 10% del millón de empleos que planea desaparecer". La Jornada (28.10. 2011a)."Cuba fortalecerá más el trabajo privado". Reuters (02.11. 2011b). BURNETT, Victoria. "Rusty road to riches in Cuba". International Herald Tribune (7.11.2011). CASTRO, Raúl. "Discurso en la clausura de la Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular". Granma (18 diciembre 2010). "Informe central al VI Congreso del PCC". La Habana, 16 abril de 2011. CAVE, Damien. "Cuba to allow buying and selling of property, with few restrictions". The New York Times (04.11.2011). ESPINA, Mayra; Rodríguez, José Luis; Triana, Juan y Hernández, Rafael. "El Período Especial veinte años después". Temas, n.º 65 (2011), p. 59-75. ESPINOSA Chepe, Oscar. Cambios en Cuba: pocos, limitados y tardíos. La Habana, 2011 (en línea): http://reconciliacioncubana.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/cambios-en-cuba.pdf FRANK, Marc. "Cuba to grant much larger plots to farmers". Reuters (19.10.2011). Información sobre el resultado del debate de los lineamientos de la política económica y social del partido y la revolución. La Habana, VI Congreso del PCC, 1 mayo de 2011. Ley general de la vivienda. Decreto-Ley n.º 288 de 28 de octubre 2011 y otras disposiciones legales. Gaceta Oficial, La Habana, 2 noviembre 2011, p. 359-373. LUGO, Orlando. Entrevista en Juventud Rebelde (14 mayo2011). La Habana. MESA-LAGO, Carmelo. "Estructura demográfica y envejecimiento poblacional: implicaciones sociales y económicas para el sistema de seguridad social en Cuba". Espacio Laical, vol. 6, n.º 3 (2010a), p. 87-92. "El desempleo en Cuba: de oculto a visible". Espacio Laical, vol. 6, n.º 4 (2010b), p. 59-66. "Cincuenta años de servicios sociales en Cuba". Temas, n.º 64 (2010c), p. 45-56. "Cuba: ¿Qué cambia tras el VI Congreso del Partido Comunista?" Nueva Sociedad, n.º 234 (2011), p. 4-18. MESA-LAGO, C. y VIDAL, Pavel. "The impact of the global crisis in Cuba's economy and social welfare". Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 42, n.º 4 (2010), p. 689-717. MURILLO, Marino. "Resultados económicos del año 2010 y el plan de la economía para 2011". Granma (18 diciembre 2010). NOVA, Armando. "El papel estratégico de la agricultura: problemas y medidas". Temas (9 de abril 2010). ONE-Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas. Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2009. La Habana, 2010a. Sector agropecuario. Indicadores seleccionados. La Habana, 2011a. Panorama económico y social Cuba 2010. La Habana, 2011b. Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2010. La Habana, 2011c. Sector agropecuario. Indicadores seleccionados . La Habana, 2011d. PEDRAZA, Lina. "Intervención acerca de las propuestas para el perfeccionamiento y actualización del sistema tributario". Granma (16 diciembre 2010). PELÁEZ, Orfilio. "Raising retirement age is not incompatible with downsizing staff". Granma International (5 mayo 2011). PÉREZ Villanueva, Omar E. "Notas recientes sobre la economía de Cuba". Espacio Laical, vol. 6, n.º 3 (2010), p. 75-81. Proyecto de lineamientos de la política económica y social, VI Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba. La Habana, 9 noviembre 2010. Regulaciones para la transmisión de la propiedad de vehículos de motor. Decreto n.º 929 de 27 de septiembre y otras disposiciones legales. Gaceta Oficial (27 se septiembre 2011), p. 331-344. RITTER, Archibald. "Microenterprise tax reform, 2010". The Cuban Economy (10 de enero de 2011) (en línea): http://thecubaneconomy.com/articles/2011/01/micro-enterprise-tax-reform-2010-the-right-direction-but-still-onerous-and-stultifying/ VIDAL, Pavel. "Desarticular el monopolio de la centralización estatal". Entrevista de Lenier González, Espacio Laical, vol. 7, n.º 26 (2011), p. 46-52. VIDAL, P. y PÉREZ Villanueva, Omar E. "Se extiende el cuentrapropismo en Cuba". Espacio Laical, vol. 6, nº. 3 (2010), p. 53-58.
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