The hit teams that carried out Castro’s vendettas
Posted on Saturday, 04.21.12
The hit teams that carried out Castro's vendettas
In an excerpt, the first of three, from his new book, 'Castro's Secrets: The CIA and Cuba's Intelligence Machine,' Brian Latell a retired CIA agent now with the University of Miami, discloses how a Cuban intelligence defector
Assassination operations had always been Fidel's personal bailiwick. None could be conducted that he did not authorize and help plan. The means for carrying out this most sinister of secret Cuban capabilities were always decentralized and rigidly compartmentalized. It was not scruples that concerned Fidel but the need for airtight deniability.
The Cubans used DGI-controlled illegals, surrogates of other nationalities, as executioners. They carried out some of the most sensitive missions overseas, especially against high-visibility, well-protected targets. Death squads drawn from Latin American terrorist and revolutionary groups beholden to Cuba could be relied on, deniability compounded by degrees of separation. Carefully screened, the foreign assassins were trained at secret Cuban bases, learning to kill in gangland-style hits, elaborately orchestrated paramilitary operations, commando strikes and sly poisonings.
In the most sensitive operations, when even greater deniability was desired, Fidel did rely on carefully screened Cubans. In the 1970s and 1980s, according to Aspillaga, a super-secret four-man squad of assassins reported exclusively to Castro. In our meetings, Aspillaga described two of Fidel's secret assassins. One he knew in the 1980s was nicknamed "El Chiquitico,'' the Little One. Another was familiar to him only as "El Chamaco,'' the Kid. In one of our recorded interviews, Aspillaga said of Fidel, "When he chooses someone, he takes his personality and dominates you . . . he controls you mentally. That's what he did to those four assassins.'' They had been molded and brainwashed, Aspillaga believed, into blindly loyal killing machines.
I asked him for examples of their handiwork.
Fidel, he said, "had generals in Bolivia, who were involved in Che's death, killed.'' CIA analysts had come to that conclusion years before Aspillaga defected. Four Bolivians — two generals, an army captain, and a peasant — who had materially contributed to the demise of Castro's lieutenant Che Guevara were assassinated, for all appearances, by death squads. Another general, Rene Barrientos, the popular president of Bolivia when Che was killed, died himself a year and a half later in an unexplained helicopter crash.
In the late 1960s, we CIA desk analysts knew nothing about Castro's personal team of assassins and, frankly, little about his compulsion for lethal revenge. But the number and pattern of the killings of the Bolivians, Fidel's obvious motive, and the professionalism of the executions all suggested official Cuban involvement. These were not the kinds of mysterious deaths that could have been explained away as heart attacks, suicides, or accidents. We had no doubt that the Bolivians had been murdered by killers intent on avenging Che.
The first to die after Barrientos was Honorato Rojas, a subsistence farmer in the Bolivian backlands where Che's insurgency had struggled for a toehold. At first Rojas assisted a band of guerrillas commanded by one of Guevara's lieutenants, agreeing to guide them through the tangled terrain. But a Bolivian army officer persuaded him to betray the strange, bedraggled intruders, most of them Cubans. On Aug. 31, 1967, Rojas led the guerrillas straight into a killing ambush at the confluence of two swift rivers. A half dozen of Guevara's dwindling band were killed instantly, and others were captured. It was one of the decisive skirmishes in the lopsided Bolivian conflict and was followed five weeks later by Che's capture and execution.
Rojas' betrayal was key to the failure of the entire revolutionary endeavor; the ambush he arranged eliminated a third of Che's force. In July 1969, Rojas paid the ultimate price for his treachery. The luckless peasant was gunned down by unknown assailants claiming to be members of a Bolivian revolutionary front.
The next target was Roberto Quintanilla, a Bolivian army intelligence officer who played a role in Che's failure. He was murdered in Germany in 1971. The best known victim was Gen. Joaquin Zenteno, commander of the army division that pursued Che. Zenteno was shot in Paris in May 1976 while serving as his country's ambassador. The previously unknown Che Guevara Command claimed responsibility; it was never heard from again. Two weeks later another general, Juan Jose Torres, a top Bolivian staff officer who had ratified the order for Che to be executed, was murdered by an Argentine death squad. All the cases quickly went cold.
General Zenteno was doubly anathema to Fidel. Assisting him in his hunt for Che were two Cuban exile contract CIA operatives, both veterans of the earlier clandestine wars across the Florida Straits. They were well known to Cuban intelligence. In his memoirs, Felix Rodriguez admitted participating in an assassination plot against Fidel in 1961, and he believes he was targeted for death by Castro after Che's execution. Gustavo Villoldo, the second Cuban exile advisor to General Zenteno, also published memoirs, and told me that he was targeted for death on three different occasions by Cuban operatives, most recently in 2003 during a visit to Bolivia.
Arranging for the executions of defectors, traitors, worthy enemies, and even an occasional foreign general was commonplace in Fidel's nearly 50-year career in office. Targeting serving and former heads of states was a more daring undertaking.
But through most of his years in power, Fidel played by his own vengeful rules. At least four sitting or former presidents of Latin American countries were the targets of meticulously planned Cuban "black'' operations. Probably other such operations left no traces.
Knowledgeable exile sources have told me that Fidel for years had his predecessor, Fulgencio Batista, marked for execution. The old dictator, living in exile in Portugal and Spain, was the target in 1973 of an elaborately rehearsed Cuban plot.
Fidel's plan was not to assassinate him but to snatch, or kidnap, him alive. It would be a Cuban version of the justice meted out to Nazi mass murderer Adolf Eichmann, who was kidnapped by Israeli intelligence in Argentina and convicted in a show trial in Jerusalem in 1961. Cuban commandoes and DGI operatives were ready to seize Batista from the walled compound near Lisbon where he lived or when he ventured out. He would be drugged, smuggled to Havana — probably on a Cuban merchant vessel — displayed and humiliated before a revolutionary tribunal, and then executed.
I learned of this previously untold conspiracy from a ranking DGI defector. Now living in the United States under an assumed identity, he learned of the Lisbon plot from another senior DGI officer with knowledge of what was in the works. "The plan was ready to be implemented," he told me. "We had a squad of illegals set up in a safe house, ready to seize Batista and take him to Cuba . . or assassinate him if the plot could not be fulfilled. It was elaborately planned.'' Ironically, Batista died of natural causes during a vacation at a Spanish resort town in August 1973 shortly before the operation was to take place.
The savage Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo was another early example. He was a genuine tyrant from almost any perspective. Trujillo authorized the torture and merciless killing of his opponents. The grudge Fidel held, however, was due to Trujillo's sponsorship of a clumsy coup attempt against him in August 1959. Castro even then — his first summer in power — was running double agents, one of whom kept him informed of Trujillo's conspiracy. And Castro, I was told by a DGI defector, plotted unsuccessfully to strike back with an assassination.
For Castro, however, there were no more deserving objects of his wrath than two of modern Latin America's most reviled dictators. Also both generals, Anastasio Somoza, the durable Nicaraguan dictator, and Augusto Pinochet, the Chilean president from 1973 until 1989, were for years high on Fidel's most wanted list.
Somoza, commander of Nicaragua's National Guard before inheriting the presidency in 1967, had done much to earn Fidel's wrath. Working with the CIA, he had provided training facilities and an air base for the Bay of Pigs brigade in 1961. Two years later he allowed an exile group to train and launch sabotage attacks on the island form a base on Nicaragua's Caribbean coast. Somoza's was the kind of mercenary belligerence that Castro cannot forgive.
The DGI mounted the first serious attempt against the dictator in 1964. But it was not until 16 years later that a perfectly executed commando operation succeeded in assassinating the former Nicaraguan leader. The armored car in which he was being chauffeured in the streets of Asunciòn, Paraguay, was incinerated in a coolly calibrated bazooka attach on Sept. 17, 1980.
Jorge Masetti has written about it. Masetti was the son and namesake of a fallen Argentine guerrilla leader who had been close to Che. Following in his father's footsteps, the younger Masetti was for years a roving DGI warrior and operative. After defecting in 1990, he described Somoza's murder. It was a precision attack, conceived, planned, and practiced to perfection at a secret base in Cuba.
The executioner "knelt in the middle of the street,'' according to Masetti. "His shot hit the mark dead center, but the projectile was a dud. And then, amid the ensuing crossfire . . . he calmly reloaded and made the second shot that killed Somoza. The guerrillas then hastily withdrew according to plan.'' Masetti knew them; they were a group of Argentine terrorists, DGI illegals.
With Somoza gone, Pinochet rose to the top of Fidel's demonology. Leader of the September 1973 coup that overthrew fervid Cuban ally Salvador Allende, the Chilean president would proves less vulnerable than the exiled Somoza. There may have been other failed attempts, but the one that came closest to success occurred in September 1986.
It was a paramilitary operation similar to the one against Somoza, conducted in 1986 at the curve of a road in the outskirts of the capital of Santiago with an arsenal of heavy weapons. Two Cuban defectors — former top DGI operative Jose Maragon and Lazaro Betancourt, a commando and sharpshooter — know details of the meticulously planned attack. They told me the guiding Cuban hand was common knowledge in their intelligence circles.
Betancourt was familiar with the failed attempt because it was used as a case study in his commando training. His instructor had prepared the Chilean terrorists who conducted the assault. They were members of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, one of South American terrorist groups the DGI used for special operations that could not easily be traced back to Cuba.
No Cubans participated. but the planning and training had all been done at the Cuban base. Cuban Special Troops delivered the Vietnam-era American weapons used — aboard a vessel of the Cuban fishing fleet — to an isolated spot on Chile's northern Pacific coast.
The Guardian newspaper in London described the assault as "dramatically cinematic in its execution.'' Pinochet's heavy armored vehicle came under a rain of machine-gun fire and was jolted by at least one grenade explosion. Reportedly bazookas and rocket launchers were also used. The dictator, accompanied by his young grandson, was slightly wounded but went on to serve another three years in office. Five of his bodyguards were killed. and 11 others were wounded. All the attackers managed to flee safely back to Cuba.
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/04/21/v-fullstory/2760939/the-hit-teams-that-carried-out.html
Analysis: Monetary reform in Cuba — lessons from Vietnam
Analysis: Monetary reform in Cuba — lessons from VietnamBy Pavel Vidal Alejandro
Since 2010, the Cuban economy has entered a new period of economic reform, officially labeled as an "update of the economic model."
In order to weigh the extent of the visible contents of the Cuban monetary and exchange rate reform and obtain lessons from international experiences, this analysis takes some elements of the Vietnamese reform as points of comparison.
The starting point of the Cuban reform has many differences compared to Vietnam. The principal significance and benefit of looking at Vietnam lies in the similarities between the problems that Cuba is facing today in relation to those faced by Vietnam since 1986, when the country launched the Doi Moi reform. Both starting models share many characteristics of the Soviet-style system.
However, the state sector in Vietnam was smaller than in any other reforming socialist economy. Large-scale state enterprises formed only a small part of its economy. Dollar (1993), Perkings (1993) and Riedel and Comer (1995) conclude that the structure of the Vietnamese reform was convenient for responding to a "big bang" liberalization in the late 1980s. When small units are the majority, it is easier to make the market system work. Therefore, the Vietnamese economy was in a better position to respond to the incentives provided by market-oriented reform than is the current dominant big state sector in Cuba.
Low inflation is an important advantage of the current Cuban reform compared to the reform of the early 1990s, and also compared to Vietnam in the 1980s. However, the ongoing liberalization process could put price stability under risk. Like Vietnam, Cuba will experience inflationary pressures; first, coming from the unavoidable exchange rate devaluation, and second, because of the shift from officially-set prices to market prices. If Cuba's government is able to implement the planned labor adjustment and the fiscal restraints together with the opening to the non-state sector, then the risk of high inflation will be certainly lower.
Early indications show that Cuba's monetary and exchange rate reform will focus on the unification of the dual currencies, the development of an interbank market, the opening of personal credit and loans for the non-state sector, and the improvement of the strategy for monetary policy management through greater coordination and the establishment of rules.
The first step in the monetary reform, which took place in December 2011 – credit and banking services for the new private sector – seems very positive because it amplifies the role of banks, credit and monetary policy, and also because it signals the real acceptance of new actors within the Cuban economic model.
Taking into account Vietnam's Doi Moi reforms, and the changes that would seem necessary to achieve the very goals of the Communist Party's Guidelines for the 2011-2015 period, there is a group of absences in monetary and exchange rate reform in Cuba. They include the emission of government bonds, the entry of foreign banks, greater competition among banks and more flexibility in interest rates, as well as issues related to the transparency of monetary policy.
It seems that there is no special monetary and exchange rate policy for socialist markets economies. Therefore, the sooner the Cuban Central Bank starts developing the conditions for conventional monetary and exchange rate strategy the better. Cuba's exchange rate adjustment in the 1990s was incomplete, since it took place only in the household sector. To eliminate the exchange rate and monetary duality, Cuban authorities must now extend the devaluation of the Cuban peso to state-owned enterprises, joint venture companies and government institutions. They have to decide whether to do it gradually or by using a "big bang" approach, as in Vietnam. The large gap between exchange rates in Cuba (2,300 percent) speaks against a sudden devaluation of that magnitude, but also against the other extreme alternative of a too-slow adjustment that would require another 20 years of bearing the costs of monetary duality.
Devaluation of the exchange rate for state-owned enterprises, joint venture companies and government institutions is unavoidable. It should be done more gradually than in Vietnam, because the high share of medium and large state enterprises in the Cuban economy makes it less prepared to respond to exchange rate incentives. Devaluation of exchange rates, fiscal restraints, labor adjustment and liberalization are pieces that would fit together if a suitable balance and proper time orchestration is achieved; otherwise, high inflation will rebound in the Cuban economy. Liberalization should not only focus on agriculture and microenterprises, but extend the opening to a non-state sector of a larger scale and foreign direct investment, in order to boost productivity and take advantages of the high level of social development, especially education.
A matter that arises from the overall analysis of the Cuban reform is the inefficiency of focusing the liberalization only on microenterprises and agriculture without taking advantage of the enormous amount of resources invested in education during the last five decades. It seems far better for sustainable economic growth, based on productivity gains, to extend the opening to the non-state sector on a larger scale, including a renewed aperture to foreign direct investments.
Monetary and exchange rate reform combined with a more comprehensive liberalization process will facilitate the finding of new engines for export and economic growth and overcome the domestic financial crisis. It is not intended that the changes occur all at once, overlooking the particular initial conditions of the country and, as a consequence, fracturing macroeconomic and institutional stability. As can be seen from Vietnam, even applying a "big bang" approach in some periods, the reform took several years to complete significant transformations of the economic system. Yet Cuba should try everything possible to speed up its process to recover lost time.
Pavel Vidal is an economist with the University of Havana's Centro de Estudios de la Economía Cubana (CEEC). This is a condensed version of a larger analysis, which can be found at:http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Vrf/pdf/473.pdf
La dignidad de Cuba
La dignidad de CubaViernes, Abril 13, 2012 | Por René Gómez Manzano
LA HABANA, Cuba, abril, www.cubanet.org -A los pocos días de finalizada la histórica visita a Cuba de Su Santidad Benedicto XVI —una figura pública de talla mundial que no puede ser considerada un aliado del régimen castrista—, le ha tocado el turno al señor Nguyen Phu Trong, secretario general del Partido Comunista de Vietnam, uno de los países más identificados con el actual gobierno cubano.
Tras el recibimiento en el aeropuerto (realizado, por cierto, no por el general Raúl Castro, que sí se molesta en ir hasta Rancho Boyeros cada vez que el teniente coronel Chávez llega a La Habana, aunque sea en visita privada para recibir tratamiento médico), se han realizado todos los demás actos protocolares habituales en casos como éste.
Se han sucedido el recibimiento formal en Palacio, una entrega de medalla, entrevistas con el Presidente y otros altos funcionarios, sendas ofrendas florales a José Martí y Ho Chi Minh, visitas a diversos centros de interés. En el caso del líder vietnamita han faltado los actos de masas, como los que sistemáticamente tenían lugar durante la permanencia en Cuba de aliados de ese nivel, y como los que sí se realizaron —y en más de una ocasión— durante la estancia en la Isla del Santo Padre.
El pasado martes, los ciudadanos de a pie, que generalmente le hacen "el caso del perro" a este tipo de visitantes, se sintieron algo motivados al anunciarse la donación de cinco mil toneladas de arroz por parte de la nación indochina. Ese aviso, aunque para los cubanos represente apenas media libra por persona, despierta merecida atención en una población atosigada por las carencias de todo tipo, como la nuestra. Ese regalo merece que hagamos algunas consideraciones.
La historia de Vietnam durante la segunda mitad del siglo XX es bien conocida. Al término del régimen colonial francés, el país quedó dividido en dos: el Norte comunista y el Sur de libre empresa y regímenes autoritarios. Un lustro más tarde, los izquierdistas sudvietnamitas, con el decidido apoyo de Hanoi, comenzaron la subversión contra el gobierno de Saigón.
Los Estados Unidos, decididos a impedir la extensión del sistema comunista, intervinieron de modo destacado con todo su poderío militar y con el apoyo de varios de sus aliados. Esa conflagración marcó a toda una generación de norteamericanos y ciudadanos de otras naciones.
En el caso específico del país indochino, el conflicto lo arrasó: Sobre él se lanzaron más bombas que durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. El setenta por ciento de los poblados fue eliminado. Los muertos —en su gran mayoría hombres jóvenes— se contaron por millones (aunque hay que decir que de esto los cubanos nos enteramos después, porque las noticias que publicaba nuestra prensa en esa época sólo mencionaban las bajas del otro lado…).
Al término del conflicto, tras varios años de ortodoxia económica estalinista, se inició una política de renovación, que ha permitido un desarrollo impetuoso. Esto incluye la esfera agropecuaria, que ha tenido un notable incremento, en particular en lo referente a la producción de arroz, renglón del que ese país se ha convertido en importantísimo exportador.
Lo anterior resulta más impactante si tenemos en cuenta que Vietnam tiene una densidad demográfica de más de 260 habitantes por kilómetro cuadrado —casi tres veces mayor que la de Cuba—, situación que se ve exacerbada por las extensas áreas de bosques y montañas que existen en ese territorio asiático.
¡Y que ese país superpoblado, que en 1959 no podía ni soñar con compararse con el nuestro y que durante más de un década y media sufrió una guerra terrible, venga ahora a ayudar a Cuba, en donde, a pesar de la inmisericorde propaganda castrista, no ha caído ni una pedrada norteamericana, es algo que, si no es el colmo, se acerca mucho a éste!
Espero que los gobernantes cubanos, al tender la escudilla de mendigo —¡en esta ocasión nada menos que a Vietnam!— por lo menos tengan el pudor de prohibirles a sus plumíferos y cotorrones que sigan hablando de "la dignidad de Cuba".
Vietnam dona 5.000 toneladas de arroz a La Habana
Relaciones Cuba-Vietnam
Vietnam dona 5.000 toneladas de arroz a La Habana
El Secretario General del Partido Comunista vietnamita se encuentra de visita en la Isla, acompañado por una delegación de altísimo nivel que incluye a los titulares de Exteriores, Industria y Comercio, Planificación e Inversiones, Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, Finanzas, y Construcción
Agencias, La Habana | 11/04/2012 11:05 am
El secretario General del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Vietnam, Nguyen Phu Trong, de visita en la Isla, hizo entrega este martes a Cuba de una donación de 5.000 toneladas de arroz, según informó la televisión estatal.
De acuerdo con un reporte de Efe, el donativo fue entregado al secretario general de la Central de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC, sindicato único), Salvador Valdés Mesa, durante un acto celebrado en el puerto de La Habana.
Nguyen resaltó "la amistad fraterna" y el apoyo de su país a Cuba, donde más de una docena de técnicos vietnamitas asesoran a cultivadores cubanos de arroz en un proyecto para incrementar los rendimientos en la producción del cereal.
El dirigente vietanamita también viajó a Pinar del Río, una de las sedes del programa de colaboración bilateral, según reportaron otros medios locales.
Nguyen anunció que la cooperación bilateral se extenderá a otras áreas como la acuicultura y las producciones de maíz y soya, entre otros renglones.
El programa arrocero Cuba-Vietnam, encaminado a obtener semillas e impulsar la producción especializada de arroz, abarca este año más de 8.000 hectáreas, de acuerdo con datos del ministerio de la Agricultura cubano citados por medios locales.
La cooperación en ese campo se inició en 2002, primero en la provincia oriental Granma, y actualmente participan centenares de productores cubanos, radicados en ocho provincias.
Vietnam es el principal proveedor de arroz a Cuba, de acuerdo con fuentes oficiales.
Cuba importa más de 400.000 toneladas de arroz al año, el 60 % de la cantidad total que consumen sus 11,2 millones de habitantes, que consideran este cereal básico en su dieta diaria.
El dirigente comunista vietnamita llegó a Cuba el pasado domingo, acompañado por el viceprimer ministro Nguyen Thien Nhan y el ministro de Exteriores, Pham Binh Minh, así como por los ministros de Industria y Comercio, Planificación e Inversiones, Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, Finanzas, y Construcción.
Nguyen Phu Trong explicó que durante su estancia de cuatro días en la isla tratará de "ampliar y fomentar aún más la cooperación estratégica en unos momentos en los que la exigencia, tanto en Cuba como en Vietnam, debe ser mayor", según informó en su momento el diario oficialista Granma.
Nguyen Phu Trong se reunió la víspera con el presidente cubano Raúl Castro, y tiene previsto concluir el próximo jueves su visita oficial a la isla.
Vietnam es considerado por el Gobierno cubano un aliado político y económico, con un comercio bilateral que en los últimos años ha superado los 500 millones de dólares y que lo sitúa como el principal proveedor de arroz de la isla.
El viaje de Phu Trong se produce en un momento en el que en que la isla está inmersa en un plan de reformas para "actualizar" su modelo económico socialista e intentar salir de la crisis que arrastra desde hace décadas.
http://www.cubaencuentro.com/cuba/noticias/vietnam-dona-5-000-toneladas-de-arroz-a-la-habana-275732
Recados de Asia y puertas rotas
Represión
Recados de Asia y puertas rotasRaúl RiveroMadrid 07-04-2012 – 10:46 am.
El gobierno asiente cuando se habla de concordia y despliega una nueva ola represiva.
El gobierno cubano le hace señas de lejos al capitalismo de Estado. Deja mensajes tentadores en los buzones siempre abiertos de empresarios, ilusos, pícaros y traficantes. Dice que hasta se puede ser amigos de extranjeros con ideas políticas diferentes. Asiente en silencio cuando se hacen llamadas a la concordia nacional. Y, al mismo tiempo, despliega una ola represiva que estremece al país y lo devuelve por las orejas a su violenta manigua particular.
Es como si la jefatura se viera obligada a buscar otros rumbos para seguir en el poder y no tuviera el valor de arriesgarse a entrar con resolución en unas dependencias en las que, rumores llegados de China y de Vietnam, les advierten que será más difícil ejercer el control absoluto.
Esa eventual pérdida les produce un temblor anticipado y en cuanto detectan el impulso de la libertad en algún punto acuden a la fuerza, ese concubinato de furia y debilidad que enrarece los gestos de buena voluntad pero es la única garantía para otro plazo de tiempo al totalitarismo.
Esta semana el trabajo ha comenzado en la zona oriental. Cuando todavía los empleados desmantelaban las instalaciones para la misa que celebró el Papa Benedicto XVI en el santuario de El Cobre y se recogían los cartelones de bienvenida, la policía arrestó a medio centenar de opositores y Damas de Blanco, propinó golpizas, allanó viviendas, realizó confiscaciones sin órdenes judiciales, cortó servicios telefónicos y organizó actos de repudio.
Uno de los episodios más dramáticos de la jornada tuvo lugar en la casa de José Daniel Ferrer, uno de los exprisioneros políticos del grupo de los 75 que se negó a ser desterrado a España.
El hombre pudo hacer una última llamada a un periodista independiente y le dijo de manera apresurada: "Están asaltando mi vivienda… Los jefes de la policía política de la zona y otros jefes de Santiago de Cuba acaban de personarse en mi vivienda y quieren derribar la puerta".
Los cubanos que piden ahora desde la Isla solidaridad ante esos actos intimidatorios y el uso de la violencia recuerdan que allí las distancias son cortas y las armas largas.
Sus reclamos no son emocionales ni están dictados por el ansia de protagonismo o por el miedo. Responden a la experiencia de amanecer todos los días entre un visaje de cambios y una brigada de policías.
http://www.diariodecuba.com/cuba/10504-recados-de-asia-y-puertas-rotas
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